Is There a Right to Hold a Delusion? : Delusions as a Challenge for Human Rights Discussion by Stenlund, Mari
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Abstract:

The analysis presented in this article reveals an ambiguity and tension in human rights theory concerning the delusional person's freedom of belief and thought. Firstly, it would appear that the concepts 'opinion' and 'thought' are defined in human rights discussion in such a way that they do include delusions. Secondly, the internal freedom to hold opinions and thoughts is defined in human rights discussion and international human rights covenants as an absolute human right which should not be restricted in any situation for any reason. These views, if understood literally, imply that a person has an absolute right to hold a delusion. However, this kind of conclusion has not been made in mental health laws, the ethical principles guiding psychiatric care or the practice of psychiatry. Instead, they assume that the use of involuntary antipsychotic medication is justified even thought its purpose is to influence delusions. The ambiguity and tension in human rights theory concerning the freedom of belief and thought challenge us to develop this theory within an interdisciplinary discussion so that people with delusions are taken into account properly. 
1. Introduction

Freedom of belief, conscience, opinion and thought​[1]​ are human rights protected by international human rights covenants, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966, articles 18-19) of the United Nations and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR 1950, articles 9-10) of the Council of Europe. As human rights, freedom of belief and thought also reside with individuals who suffer from mental disorders, something that ethical principles guiding psychiatric care often emphasize. For example, Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (PPPMI 1991, principle 1:5) declares that “every person with a mental illness shall have the right to exercise all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights” as recognized in international human rights covenants.       
	Human rights conventions and ethical guidelines attempt to express a common view about what is ethically good and how people should be treated. However, sometimes the formulations of conventions and guidelines are not expressed clearly and they are in tension with the other formulations expressed. In this article I will present the tensions and ambiguity concerning the freedom of belief and thought of individuals with delusions. I will describe how delusions challenge the views often presented in the current human rights discussion. 
	I start by introducing the philosophical debate concerning the status of delusions as beliefs. After that I bring the question about delusions into the human rights discussion concerning freedom of belief and thought. I will note, firstly, that the definitions given in human rights discussion for the concepts 'opinion' and 'thought' also seem to cover delusions. Secondly, I will note that the freedom to hold opinions and thoughts is defined as an absolute right. On the grounds of these two notions, I will ask whether there is an absolute right to hold a delusion and whether the use of involuntary antipsychotic medication is conceptually against currently expressed human rights theory. Since there seems to be inconsistencies both within human rights theory and between theory and practice on this specific issue, I will  suggest that the human rights theory concerning the freedom of belief and thought should be developed. We should seek such definitions of these rights which would also be valid when we face a person with delusions. Even though the purpose of this article is to point out the tension, not to solve it, at the end of the article I will present some visions about what themes, in particular, should be considered in any future discussion in order to clarify and streamline human rights theory. 
2. Philosophical debate: Are delusions beliefs?
The nature of delusions and psychosis (or in the history of ideas, so-called madness), has always inspired philosophical discussion. During the last two decades, the discussion concerning psychotic delusions has, if anything, grown (see e.g. Radden 2011; Heinimaa 2008; Sass 1994). One theme of the debate is the status of delusions as beliefs (see e.g. Bortolotti 2010; Hamilton 2007; Bayne & Pacherie 2005; Currie & Ravenscroft 2002; Currie & Jureidini 2001; Berrios 1991). 
	Traditionally delusions have been considered as beliefs, which can be seen, for example, in the definitions provided in diagnostic manuals. The fourth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) defines a delusion as “a false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality” (DSM-IV-TR 2000, 821). However, the status of delusions as beliefs has been questioned in philosophical discussion. The reason for this is that delusions have been considered as irrational on the grounds of their content or the way in which they are ascribed. Scholars interested in the philosophy of psychiatry have claimed that delusions are, for example, 'empty speech acts', 'imaginations' or 'stances' rather than beliefs. 
2.1. Delusions as empty speech acts	

German Berrios (1991, 6, 8, 12) denies that delusions are beliefs and suggests instead that delusions are empty speech acts. According to Berrios, delusions are speech acts because they have a form, a purported content and course. As speech acts, delusions are, nevertheless, empty because their informational content does not refer to the world nor to the self, as other speech acts do. Berrios seems to mean that delusions are irrational in the sense that they do not correspond with an external or internal reality. According to Berrios, one sign of this irrationality is that delusions are not responsive to evidence, whilst beliefs are.​[2]​  
2.2. Delusions as imaginings

Gregory Currie, Ian Ravenscroft and Jon Jureidini claim that delusions are imaginings. The basis for this claim is the supposition that people aim to have a consistent belief system. Therefore, if a belief is inconsistent with one's other beliefs, a person rejects it or reconsiders his or her belief system as a whole. However, people sometimes seem to adopt delusions which are not consistent with their belief system. If delusions are imaginings, it would, according to Currie, Ravenscroft and Jureidini, explain why people adopt delusions in spite of such inconsistencies. Namely, the imaginings a person has may be inconsistent with his or her beliefs. A delusional individual fails to recognize that delusions are imaginings and therefore he or she mistakenly considers them as beliefs (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002, 161-184; Currie & Jureidini 2001). 
2.3. Delusional stance 	

Lynn G. Stephens and George Graham suggest that a person with delusions is in a delusional stance. They describe a delusional stance as a special and complex higher-order attitude towards lower-order states, thoughts and attitudes (Stephens & Graham 2007, 203; Stephens & Graham 2004, 236-239). Stephens and Graham list the major components of a delusional stance. First, the mark of a delusional stance is that the person experiences the content of the delusion as an act of thinking, on his or her part. Second, the person with a delusional stance resists changing a lower-order thought which is challenged, for example, by evidence to the contrary. Third, a person with a delusional stance does not have insight concerning the lower-order thought which is the object of the delusion. This means that the person in a delusional stance does not think that something is wrong with him or her (Stephens & Graham 2007, 203-209). 
2.4. Are beliefs rational?

Views which question the status of delusions as beliefs on the grounds that they are not rational, have been challenged. According to Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie (2005, 171), “Currie's claim about consistency appears to be implausibly strong” since people's “cognitive behaviour does not always meet the normative standards that it ought to”. For example, self-deception and the partial encapsulation of belief are, according to Bayne and Pacherie, common phenomena. 
	Lisa Bortolotti (2010) also opposes the claim that delusions are not beliefs because they are irrational. Bortolotti admits that delusions are often irrational. She claims, however, that beliefs need not be rational to be defined as beliefs. By referring to examples from prejudices and self-deception to religious beliefs, Bortolotti describes how beliefs often fail in the area of rationality. 
	Bortolotti (2010, 1, 3, 7) notes that the question concerning the status of delusions as beliefs is meaningful when it comes to issues concerning human rights and the ethics of psychiatry. It has been claimed, for example, that having beliefs is a necessary condition for autonomous agency.      
	Even though human rights discussion is also connected with philosophy, it is worth noting that there are differences between philosophical approaches and the approaches presented in human rights discussions. The philosophical discussion about epistemologically justified beliefs and the human rights discussion concerning the kinds of beliefs and thoughts people have a right to hold are two distinct debates. It seems that the human rights discussion is less concerned about whether beliefs are rational and more about the meaning of beliefs for people who hold them. Human rights are not rules for academic philosophers but rights of ordinary people. Therefore, we also need to analyse the human rights discussion in order to understand better the status of delusions in the context of human rights. 

3. The status of delusions in human rights definitions

Human rights conventions protect several rights concerning believing and thinking. Freedom of religion, belief, opinion, conscience and thought are all mentioned in international covenants of human rights (see ICCPR 1966, articles 18-19; ECHR 1950, articles 9-10). 
	One difficulty is that there are no official definitions for the concepts of religion, belief, opinion, conscience and thought. However, some definitions have been presented in the human rights discussion because of their significance for juridical philosophy or their relevance for case law. The status of delusions can be considered in the light of this discussion. Can delusions be defined, for example, as beliefs or thoughts in the context of human rights?  
       
3.1. Are delusions beliefs?
It seems that delusions are not religions, even though they might refer to God or to something as divine. Unlike delusions a religion, as the concept is understood in human rights theory, is shared in and by a community and even as a private matter has institutional, social and cultural dimensions as well. However, beliefs are of a more individual nature than religions. The concept of a belief is defined in human rights theory wider than the concept of a religion in the sense that it also includes not only different theistic creeds but also such beliefs as agnosticism, atheism and rationalism. There are also, for example, political, philosophical and social beliefs (Lerner 2006, 5-7, Seppo 2003, 11). Since delusions typically are of an individual nature and their content varies, could they be defined as beliefs?   
	In the discussion concerning human rights, it has been noted that not every kind of opinion or idea can be defined as a belief in the same way that the concept of belief is used in the context of human rights. Ovey and White (2006, 302) express this idea as understood in the European tradition by saying that:
---a belief must 'attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance'.​[3]​   
and Lerner (2006, 7) states:
Belief has been defined legally as a “conviction of the truth of a proposition, existing subjectively in the mind, and induced by argument, persuasion, or proof addressed to the judgement.”  
	Sometimes delusions may be part of the person's wider ideology and thus not just isolated ideas without any link to other beliefs. They may also be understandable in the sense that an outsider can follow the logic of the beliefs and can understand their place in the belief system as whole. In spite of this it seems that belief status in terms of human rights may be denied on cases of delusions. For example, the case of Pretty v. The United Kingdom reveals how the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the borders of the concept of belief. In this case Diane Pretty, who suffered from motor neurone disease, wanted to commit suicide with the assistance of her husband. Therefore, her solicitor asked the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to give an undertaking not to prosecute the husband if he assisted his wife to commit suicide. The DPP refused to give undertaking, which Diane Pretty considered to be a violation of her freedom of belief. In this case the court discovered that not all opinions or convictions (like the views concerning assisted suicide) constitute beliefs that are protected by the freedom of belief. Therefore, invoking this human right could not be used in her argument against the DPP (Ovey & White 2006, 303; Pretty v. The United Kingdom 2002).  	 
	The approach is different in the United States. Unlike the European approach, which emphasizes the coherence of a belief and is oriented to its content, the American approach concentrates on the functional role of a belief. Based on the ideas of the German-American theologian Paul Tillich, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that beliefs are those thoughts or ideas that give meaning and orientation to people's lives. Therefore, for something to qualify as a belief, the person who claims to hold it must be able to show that he or she has a concern or a deep motivation that is ultimate, fundamental and cannot be compromised (Evans 2001, 62-63). Sometimes delusions can be so important and meaningful for the individual that it is meaningful to ask whether they can be said to be ultimate concerns of the person. Even though belief status in terms of human rights may be denied at least in many cases, it can be asked, whether some delusions could be defined, in the American tradition, as beliefs.​[4]​    
3.2. Are delusions matters of conscience?	

Human rights conventions also protect the freedom of conscience. Sometimes the concept of conscience is understood as parallel to the concept of belief especially when it refers to beliefs that are not religious. The concept is understood in this way for example in the Finnish constitution which lists  “freedom of religion and conscience” as a fundamental right (Ojanen and Scheinin 2011, 416; Finnish constitution 1999, 11§). In this sense it is questionable whether delusions can be defined as matters of conscience in the same way that it is questionable whether they can be defined as beliefs.
	Sometimes the concept of conscience refers instead to the moral attitudes and decisions of the individual. According to Karl Josef Partsch (1981, 214), the concept of conscience refers to all morality on the personal sphere. If understood in this way, some delusions might be defined as matters of conscience. According to DSM-IV (2000, 821) a delusion involves sometimes a value judgement which can be recognized as a delusion because it “is so extreme as to defy credibility”. As personal and internal matters these kinds of delusions might be matters of conscience. However, the definition of the concept of conscience seem to be very unclear. Therefore it is questionable whether the concept includes some delusions.
3.3. Are delusions opinions?

According to the Covenant provision of ICCPR, the concept of opinion refers in particular to convictions concerning secular, civil and political matters (Partsch 1981, 217). The interpretation adopted by the European Court of Human Rights requires that expressed opinions, at least if they are damaging, have something to do with facts. Even value judgements which cannot be proved, should have a sufficient factual basis. This view arose in a context where defamation was being discussed (Ovey and White 2006, 326).​[5]​ It is worth noticing that this requirement applies to opinions that are expressed. Therefore, statements are valid when it comes to the question of whether the person has a right to express his or her delusions in public.​[6]​ It can be asked whether principles utilized in the context of freedom of expression might also be applied when the concept of opinion is defined and whether it is required that opinion as such (even though it might not be expressed) should have, at least, a slim basis in fact. However, it seems that in the case of defamation there has been a need to restrict expressing such opinions which may damage somebody else. Thus, statements of the European Court of Human Rights seem to focus on how freedom of expression should be restricted in order to protect the rights of others. They do not seem to offer a definition of opinion as such. 
	When it comes to the definition of an opinion as such, Carolyn Evans (2001, 68) seems to suspect that when we discuss the right to hold opinions silently in the mind, these opinions must concern “religious or other important issues” (whatever the term 'important' means in this context, it seems to be some kind of requirement for the opinion to be so treated).
	On the other hand, since freedom of expression is protected in the ICCPR (1966, article 19:2) with respect to “information and ideas of all kinds” it implies that the broad expression about “all kinds” also applies to the concept of opinion since freedom of opinion is protected in the same article (19:1). The difference between external expressions and internal opinions is that the first one is allowed to restrict (for example, in cases concerning defamation), but the latter is not (see Nowak 1993, 339-342). Thus, it seems, that even though the expressed opinions should have something to do with facts, opinions held in the mind do not necessarily need to do so. From this it seems to follow that at least some delusions might be opinions. They might be included in the inclusive formulation about “information and ideas of all kinds” at least if they concern secular, civil and political matters. For example, a delusion that one is being persecuted seems to fulfil the criteria presented for the concept of opinion.    
3.4. Are delusions thoughts?
The human rights definition of the concept of thought also seeks to be as inclusive as possible. The Covenant provision of ICCPR stated that, compared with the concept of opinion, which refers more to secular matters, the concept of thought may be used especially in connection with faith, creed and religion (Partsch 1981, 217). Bahiyyih G. Tazhib (1996, 313) seems to interpret the ICCPR in such a way that any conceivable kind of thought should be understood as thought in a discussion concerning freedom of thought. Tazhib describes the concept of thought in the context of human rights:
It appears that freedom of thought applies to every conceivable kind of thought on any subject an individual might have.
Tazhib (1996, 312) also describes the scope of freedom of thought in ICCPR:
The exercise of freedom of thought is not limited to the sphere of religion. Therefore, the Committee clarified in the first sentence that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion encompasses freedom of thought “on all matters”.  
	Partsch (1981, 213) also presents this inclusive notion when he discusses the terms 'thought', 'conscience' and 'religion'. According to Partsch, these concepts cover together “all possible attitudes of the individual toward the world, toward society, and toward that which determines his fate and the destiny of the world, be it a divinity, some superior being or just reason and rationalism, or chance”.​[7]​ It seems that, if not all, at least most delusions fit in to these categories of “every conceivable kinds of thoughts” and “all possible attitudes of the individual”  at least if they concern faith, creed and religion. For example, such a grandiose delusion  as a person claiming to have a special divine identity, seems to be included in the concept of thought.                 
	The border between an opinion and a thought conceptually is not clear and their meanings overlap. Both an opinion and a thought have an internal and private nature. (Nowak 1993, 339; Partsch 1981, 217). They are both defined as inclusive and as wide as possible. Therefore, if previous definitions are taken seriously, it seems that many, even if not all, delusions should be defined as opinions or thoughts in the context of human rights. Moreover, some delusions might also be matters of conscience, or even beliefs. Probably the writers elaborating these definitions have not had the particular issue of delusions in mind. However, if we look at the definitions given, it is difficult to avoid the view that especially the concepts of opinion and thought together cover most delusions.​[8]​ 
4. Delusions and an absolute right to hold opinions and thoughts
In human rights discussion, the freedom of belief and thought has been divided in to an absolute and a non-absolute dimension. The first is an internal and private dimension and the latter is an external and public dimension of the freedom of belief and thought.​[9]​ 
4.1. Forum externum

The external dimension of the freedom of belief and thought consists of the individual's right to express and manifest his or her beliefs and thoughts and to live according to them. The external dimension of the freedom of belief and thought also includes a person's right to live and act in a relationship with others who have the same beliefs and thoughts. Thus the external dimension of the freedom of belief and thought is a public matter. Sometimes this external dimension is called the forum externum, especially in the context of the freedom of religion and belief (Ojanen and Scheinin 2011, 416; Kortteinen 1996, 55; Tazhib 1996, 26-27, 87; Partsch 1981, 214, 217). 
	The forum externum is non-absolute right, which means that it can be limited in certain situations (Ojanen & Scheinin 2011, 418-419; Tahzib 1996, 26-27). According to the ICCPR (1966, article 19:3), the freedom of expression may be subject to certain restrictions which are provided by law and are necessary for the respect of the rights or reputations of others or for the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. When it comes to the freedom of religion and belief, the ICCPR (1966, article 18:3) declares:
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4.2. Forum internum

It is unclear how wide the internal dimension of freedom of belief and thought – sometimes called the forum internum – should be. Despite differing opinions on other matters concerning the borders of the forum internum, human rights theorists seem to share at least the view that this dimension signifies the freedom to hold thoughts and opinions 'in one's mind'. The internal dimension of the freedom of belief and thought is a private matter (Ojanen & Scheinin 2011, 417; Evans 2001, 68, 72-74; Tahzib 1996, 25-26; Nowak 1993, 314-315; Partsch 1981, 214, 217).
	The internal dimension of freedom of the belief and thought is an absolute right, which means that it should be not restricted in any situation for any reason. For example, so called brainwashing is defined as absolutely illegal (Ojanen and Scheinin 2011, 417; Evans 2001, 68, 72-74; Kortteinen 1996, 54-55; Tahzib 1996, 87-88; Nowak 1993, 314-315;  Partsch 1981, 214, 217). When it comes to the freedom to hold opinions, the ICCPR (1966, Article 19:1) declares: “Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference”. The ICCPR states no excuses for this article.
	According to Natan Lerner (2006, 8), the three freedom rights, namely, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, do not taken individually have a similar weight as legal notions. In the context of this claim, Lerner seems to refer to the idea of the forum internum:
Freedom of thought and freedom of conscience can be considered more philosophical than legalistic. Both freedoms emanate from the most internal and intimate sphere of human existence. Freedom of conscience can sometimes be legally violated or restricted. Freedom of thought, on the other hand, can only be violated or affected by complicated and sophisticated means of acting upon the human mind.​[10]​ 
	It seems that inclusive definitions of an opinion and a thought in human rights theory are possible because freedom of opinion and freedom of thought are connected only within the dimension of the forum internum (if opinions and thoughts are not expressed or manifested). Theorists may have come to the conclusion that a person has the right to have any opinion or thought whatsoever in his or her mind because an opinion or a thought that is only in one's mind cannot pose a threat to other people and cannot therefore be in conflict with the rights of others. For example, Martin Scheinin (2000, 5-6) notes:
States have not considered it difficult to allow their citizens the freedom to think. The difficulties start when we come to the right to express one's conviction, the right to organize as a community in order to promote a religion or belief and the right to act in accordance with one's conscience even in cases where a domestic legal system seems to require uniform behaviour irrespective of the different convictions held by individuals. The real problems concerning freedom of thought, conscience and religion do not concern the nucleus of the right itself, the freedom of the forum internum or an inner state of mind, but issues that relate also to other human rights.  
4.3. The forum internum and involuntary antipsychotic medication 

I concluded the section The status of delusions in human rights definitions by noting that the concepts of opinion and thought are defined in human rights discussion in such a way that they also seem to include most delusions. In the section Forum internum, I noticed that the freedom to hold opinions and thoughts is defined in human rights discussion and international human rights covenants as an absolute human right, which should not be restricted in any situation for any reason. These views imply that the person might have – if human rights definitions and formulations are understood literally – an absolute right to hold a delusion. 
	It also seems that this literal interpretation of human rights definitions and formulations is not in clear conflict with the standard justifications which are presented when the reasons why freedom of belief and thought is protected in the first place are discussed. Freedom of belief and thought is seen as fundamentally important in society, firstly, because these rights protect the individual as an autonomous thinker and consitute the basic conditions for each individual's self-fulfilment. Second, freedom of belief and thought has been seen as protecting free public political and societal discussion and free communication, which are considered fundamental  to a democratic and pluralistic society. Moreover, it has been recognized that freedom of belief and thought also has a significant role in the protection of other human rights (Kortteinen 1996, 32; Ovey & White 2006, 300-301, 319-320). It can be, and should be, questioned whether holding delusions serves an individual's self-fullfilment, whether they are needed in society or whether they constitute any kind of ground for other human rights. However, it seems that in the tradition of human rights the standard justifications mentioned are especially highlighted when it has been necessary to defend the manifesting of ideas which “offend, shock or disturb” (see, for example, Dichand and Others v. Austria 2002). It is not seem self-evident that delusions are totally different to such ideas, or if they are, this is not stated clearly. If it was the case that standard justifications of freedom of belief and thought conflicted with the conclusion that there is an absolute right to hold a delusion, this conflict, would in itself challenge us to develop human rights definitions and formulations concerning freedom of belief and thought. The need for such a development is an issue to which I will return in the discussion part of the article.        
	If we follow the literal interpretation of definitions and formulations which seem to suggest that there is an absolute right to hold a delusion, we end up by asking whether the use of involuntary antipsychotic medication is justified. Since the aim of antipsychotic medication is to relieve or remove the symptoms of psychosis (delusions included), it would appear that the exercise seeks to influence opinions and thoughts (namely delusions). For example, Manfred Nowak (1993, 314) lists “influencing of the conscious or subconscious mind with psychoactive drugs” as one of the means which interferes with an individual's spiritual and moral existence.​[11]​       
	However, mental health legislation and the ethical principles which guide psychiatric care do not consider the use of involuntary antipsychotic medication as an act which violates the forum internum. Instead, involuntary antipsychotic medication is not only used in practice, but the use of it is allowed in the mental health legislation of many (if not all) countries and in international ethical guidelines. For example, PPPMI (1991, Principle 11:6) notes that involuntary treatment may be given if the following conditions are satisfied: 
( a ) The patient is, at the relevant time, held as an involuntary patient; 
( b ) An independent authority, having in its possession all relevant information, including the information specified in paragraph 2 above, is satisfied that, at the relevant time, the patient lacks the capacity to give or withhold informed consent to the proposed plan of treatment or, if domestic legislation so provides, that, having regard to the patient's own safety or the safety of others, the patient unreasonably withholds such consent; and 
( c ) The independent authority is satisfied that the proposed plan of treatment is in the best interest of the patient's health needs. 
	The use of involuntary antipsychotic medication is defended for therapeutic and ethical reasons. My purpose is not to question these reasons or to claim that these practices are unethical. Instead, I point out that there is ambiguity and tension in human rights theory. On the one hand, it seems to follow from the definitions and formulations presented in the discussion concerning freedom of belief and thought that there is an absolute right to hold a delusion. On the other hand, it seems that this is not how things are understood when a psychotic patient's treatment is involved. Accusations about violating absolute human rights have been presented in antipsychiatric discussion (see e.g. Gosden 1997; Szasz 1990, 563), but it seems that the tension between the use of involuntary antipsychotic medication and the forum internum is mostly either ignored or not acknowledged in the wider discussion. 
	Before going further, I set out three points. First, it can be claimed that it is the external and, thus, the non-absolute dimension of the freedom of belief and thought which is significant when involuntary antipsychotic medication is used. Nobody is treated only because he or she holds delusions in the mind. As a matter of fact, it would be impossible to be aware of the existence of delusions if they were not expressed or manifested somehow in the public sphere. It is true that delusions are recognized on the basis of behaviour and expressions. However, antipsychotic medication does not just concern this external dimension as, for example, physical isolation does. The medication influences the delusions that the person has in mind, or at least the use of the medication has this goal.
	Second, the use of antipsychotic medication is often defended by claiming that the patient needs health care and that there is a threat to the safety and even life both of the patient and of other people. However good reasons these might be, they are not valid reasons in cases where no reason would be valid. Since the right to health or health care or the right to life are not absolute human rights they cannot be prioritized over the forum internum.               	     
	Third, it can be claimed that the freedom of belief and thought is applicable only in cases where the person is competent. In other words, the dimension of the forum internum is not restricted. It is not applied, instead. If understood in this way, the crooked claim seems to be the following: thoughts and opinions can be of whatever nature, but some thoughts and opinions imply that the person holding them is not competent to enjoy absolute freedom rights. 
	It seems to be quite clear and without serious tensions that an incompetent person's non-absolute dimension of the freedom rights can be restricted. Tensions and ambiguity are found when we ask whether competence is a requirement for the absolute dimension of freedom rights, as well. For example, PPPMI (1991, General limitation clause) does not mention that some human rights do not apply in cases involving psychotic patients. This ethical guideline speaks, instead, about limitations of rights in certain situations, which seems to imply that the right to the forum internum should apply.​[12]​    
4.4. Juridical cases

The European juridical tradition appears not to present juridical cases, at least not on the international level, based on the question whether involuntarily antipsychotic medication violates the patient's right to forum internum. Cases tried in the United States, on the other hand, show that the inconsistency between forum internum and the practice of involuntary antipsychotic medication is acknowledged. However, the inconsistency cannot be said to be solved since the juridical cases manifest the same ambiguities and tensions that are visible in the theoretical human rights discussion. 
	In the 1980s and 1990s there were juridical cases in some state and lower federal courts in the United States concerning involuntary and intrusive therapies. In these instances the courts stated that psychosurgery, electroconvulsive therapy and psychotropic medication (including antipsychotic medication) violate the person's freedom of thought, freedom of belief and freedom of mind or right to mental privacy. Psychotherapy and other verbal techniques have been considered less intrusive, because as slow therapies they allow the patient to keep his or her mental privacy and either accept or reject the change (Winick 1997, 145-136, 171-176, 210-212). 
	However, in the case of Rennie v. Klein, referenced by Winick (1997, 211, note 176), the United States Court of Appeals seems to consider problematic antipsychotic drugs that may have permanently disabling side effects. Moreover, the Court notices that, even though the patient had a right to refuse such medication, the state may, in emergency situations, “override that right when the patient is a danger to himself or others” (see Rennie v. Klein, Opinion of the Court, 1). These notions reveal that the tension between the individual's right to the forum internum and the use of involuntary antipsychotic medication is still unresolved. First, speaking about permanent side effects is not the same thing as speaking about influencing opinions or the thought process. Second, if a right may be overridden in cases of emergency the right cannot be called absolute.    
	More recent juridical cases in the United States also show that antipsychotic medication is not seen as violating the forum internum. There have been cases where criminal defendants with a psychotic disorder have refused the antipsychotic medication which had been considered necessary to restore his or her competency to stand trial. In the context of these cases (e.g. Sell v. United States), the 'liberty interests' have invoked (see the discussion about the details of the Sell case and the utilities and problems of “Sell test”, e.g.  Etheridge and Chamberlain 2006; Heilbrun and Kramer 2005; Glasgow 2004-2005; Henrich 2004-2005; Freckelton 2004; Breneman 2003-2004; Single 2003-2004 and Hayes 2003). In some cases (e.g. the case of Washington v. Harper) the 'liberty-interests' have been highlighted because the antipsychotic medication has mind-altering properties (Justice Stevens in Washington v. Harper 494 U. S. 210, 1990, I).
	However, it is unclear when the focus of the wide concept of 'liberty-interests' is on the mind-altering side-effects of antipsychotic medication, which might question the defendant's right to a fair trial, and when the focus is on the possibility that the medication might 'change' the person's opinions and thoughts and could be, for this reason, a problem from the viewpoint of the forum internum (see Benson v. Terhune E. 2002, note 7). The other question is whether 'liberty interests' are applicable only when the person is competent to decide about his or her treatment even though he or she would not be competent to stand trial (see Justice Stevens 1990​[13]​ ). 
	Moreover, at the conclusion of these cases the court has set out the conditions in which the use of involuntary antipsychotic medication is legal. If the use of involuntary antipsychotic medication was seen as violating the person's right to forum internum there could be no conditions or no situations where it was legal. In the case of Sell v. United States the court skirted, according to Debra Breneman (2003-2004, 975), the deep philosophical questions about “mental illness and its appropriate treatment, including implications regarding free thought, individual autonomy, and the connection between mind and body”. Breneman claims that “failing to acknowledge the existence of these issues and their implications for the Court's decision seems to trivialize the rights of the mentally ill”.
5. Discussion
It would appear that the definitions used in human rights discussion do not properly take into account the situation of psychotic people. Human rights discussion mainly concerns cases concerning the borders of freedom of expression (cases about hate speech, among others) and cases of religious rights (for example the question about wearing the Islamic headscarf, the right to do missionary work and the right to avoid military service because the religion concerned forbids it).   
	Even though people with delusions are an exceptional challenge, as human beings they should not be forgotten in the discussion concerning the freedom of belief and thought. The ambiguity and tensions in understanding these rights may weaken some delusional people's trust in legal protection if they, on the one hand, enjoy certain rights and yet, on the other hand, do not enjoy them. People with delusions also have a right to know about their rights. This right is not realized if it is unclear how rights should be understood.   
	Therefore, universal human rights theory concerning the freedom of belief and thought should be developed and clarified. In this work interdisciplinary discussion is necessary. To conclude, I will point out three central questions which need to be discussed further. All these themes are of an an interdisciplinary nature.   
	First, in ethical and psychiatric discussion it has been suggested that delusions are not the person's own authentic opinions and thoughts since they are distorted by the illness. Often this claim is presented implicitly by noting that psychotic people are not autonomous persons because of their mental illness (see, e.g. Beauchamp & Childress 1989, 224; Gutheil 1980, 327).  Berrios (1991, 12), who states that delusions do not in any event refer to self or internal reality, seems to be a radical representative of this view. From this point of view it could be suggested that a psychotic disorder as an alien power has violated the person's forum internum by distorting his or her mind, which is seen as such inauthentic. 
	There has been some debate about the nature of 'true freedom' in the context of patients with delusions (see e.g. Winick 1997, 164-165; Ford 1980; Gutheil 1980). However, it seems that human rights discussion concerning the freedom of belief and thought has not focused so much on questions concerning the authenticity of opinions and thoughts even though some dimensions of the 'authenticity approach' may, actually, be implicitly accepted in that discussion. The relationship between competence (a juridical concept) and authenticity (a psychological or philosophical concept) is also unclear. There may also be an inconsistency between the 'authenticity approach' and the classical way of understanding the articles in the international human rights conventions.  
	A human rights discussion about an approach which emphasizes authenticity would be important since defining opinions and thoughts (as well as religions, beliefs or matters of conscience) as inauthentic in situations where people themselves claim that a particular opinion or thought express their own views might have considerable consequences for interpreting and applying the freedom of belief and thought. Thus, the discussion about determining authenticity does not just concern a minority of delusional patients who resist involuntary antipsychotic medication. The discussion concerns the interpretations of the rights of all human beings.  
	Secondly, human rights theory is quite unclear when it comes to such questions as does forum internum protect the person holding the beliefs and thoughts with certain contents (in his or her mind) or does it protect the process whereby the person develops beliefs and thoughts. It has been suggested that the concept of thought refers to a process while the concept of opinion is the result of this process. Since there is an absolute freedom of thought and an absolute freedom to hold opinions it seems that the forum internum might protect both the process and the result (see Nowak 1993, 339; Partsch 1981, 217 ). However, clarification is needed in order to understand whether there are some kinds of requirements for the protected processes. When it comes to psychosis, it has been suggested that the interest should not be in the content of the delusions but instead in the process through which delusions develop (see e.g. Kapur 2003). Stephens and Graham (2004, 236-367) emphasize that central question is not what the delusional person thinks and believes but instead how he or she thinks and believes.  
	Thirdly we need a discussion about the definitions of the concepts of thought and opinion. Should we narrow the inclusive definitions so that delusions could no longer be defined as thoughts and opinions? As a starting point, the aim to exclude delusions in this way sounds questionable. If human rights can be redefined and narrowed in this way, we face the question whether we can invoke and trust in these rights since we may loose them whenever they are redefined. But since the psychotic person's right to the forum internum seems already to be a matter of some controversy, some kind of redefining is necessary. 
	If definitions for the concepts of thought and opinion are narrowed, one possibility will be to utilize the principles from diagnostic manuals when they consider the difference between psychotic beliefs and cultural or religious beliefs. If we followed the principles of DSM-IV, protected opinions and thoughts should be either shared in some community or  should not be symptoms of a dysfunction in the individual (see DSM-IV-TR 2000, xxxi, 821). This definition would exclude delusions and still include many other beliefs and thoughts more successfully than is the case when reference is made the concept of rationality, which is what is usually done in the current philosophical discussion concerning delusions' status as beliefs. As a clearly value-laden definition it could also encourage ethical discussion about the nature of opinions and thoughts.              
6. Conclusions
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^1	 	I will refer to the constellation of these human rights with the shorter expression 'freedom of belief and thought'.
^2	 	For a critique of Berrios's suggestion, see Bortolotti 2010, p. 118-121. 
^3	 	See also Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom 1982.
^4	 	For a critique of the American definition for the concept of belief, see Evans 2001, 63. 	
^5	 	See also the Case of Lingens v Austria 1986 and Dichand and others v Austria 2002.
^6	 	Since it seems to be the case that evaluative judgements are more protected than expressions dealing with factual matters, it might be that publicly expressing a delusion along the lines of “my problems are caused by Satan who has stolen my neighbour's soul and now influences my life spiritually through him” might receive more protection than a delusional expression like “my neighbour has blown up the door of my house”. 
^7	 	See also Scheinin (2000, 6), who refers to Partsch's definition.  
^8	 	See also Winick (1997, 162), who writes in the American context, as follows: “Thoughts deemed 'disordered' would seem no less entitled to First Amendment protection.” 
^9	 	Making this kind of distinction between the external and internal dimension is philosophically problematic. Moreover, the borders between internal and external are not clear. However, since this distinction is presupposed in both human rights conventions and human rights discussion I utilize it and lean on it.           
^10	 	See also Evans 2001, p. 52.
^11	 	Nowak does not consider the cases of psychotic patients, thus it is unclear what he thinks about involuntary antipsychotic medication as a psychiatric treatment.
^12	 	The relationship between competence and rights is also an unclear and much argued about issue in the discussion concerning the rights of children (see Langlaude 2007, 45-53, 101-104). Sylvie Langlaude (2007, 136) seems to interpret The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 14) in such a way that restrictions on the forum internum are not permissible. However, it is unclear whether and to what extent the forum internum should be applied in cases involving children.   
^13	 	Justice Stevens 1990, while invoking fundamental rights, seems to suppose that the person is competent: “There is no doubt, as the State Supreme Court and other courts that have analyzed the issue have concluded, that a competent individual's right to refuse such medication is a fundamental liberty interest deserving the highest order of protection.”
